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I
Poverty’s inhumane face cannot be fully portrayed in the numbers often found in 
the papers or presented in the news: 
as of 2004, 2,533 million or 39.7 percent of the human kind were reportedly living in 
severe poverty. […] Each year some 18 million of them die prematurely of poverty related 
causes2.
 Within political theory there have been numerous attempts to conceptualise and 
address the morally problematic phenomenon of the global absolute deprivation of 
goods, poverty. Prominently, liberal cosmopolitans such as Kok-Chor Tan and Simon 
Caney have presented compelling arguments regarding duties for the alleviation 
global poverty and have argued on the global scope of the normatively relevant 
relations. Yet, the considerable amount of work cosmopolitans have produced to 
justify the duties we have against the global poor seems to have taken priority over a 
fundamental conceptualization of poverty itself fund its causes3. 
Although conspicuously absent from the global justice debate, Marxism, I 
maintain - in the eyes of John Roemer and his Marxian theory of exploitation - 
offers a more apt understanding of poverty. The lesson to be learned from Roemer 
is that, for one, poverty cannot be appropriately conceptualized without a reference 
to causally fundamental links between necessary conditions of relative deprivation 
(inequality) of positional goods (access to the means of production) in the current 
mode of production and absolute deprivation (poverty) itself while, for another, that 
those links should not escape normative scrutiny.
Overall, in this short piece, I seek to illustrate the lack of analysis on the causes 
of global poverty in the cosmopolitan approach and show how cosmopolitans need 
Marxists (or Marxians), and in this case Roemer, to provide a fundamental analysis of 
global justice. I do so as follows. In section II, I set out two conditions for an acceptable 
analysis of poverty while also analyse the subsequent failure of cosmopolitans to 
place their analysis at an appropriately fundamental level. In Chapter III, I show the 
relation between exploitation and poverty while I also stress the normative merits of 





Consider the following case. A student is taking a mathematics test on a whole 
year’s curriculum – typically including more than one topic. Further assume that 
the student fails the test and has to retake it. Acknowledging that the outcome of 
his attempt to pass the test is undesirable for the student and that the student ought 
to have passed the test is undeniably important. Yet, if the student wants to pass the 
test, it is arguably of more value to think and assess what led to the student failing 
the test. It could well be that the student lacks necessary knowledge and practice in 
specific topics or that the way the student is studying allows for many distractions 
to come into his way and thus be less efficient etc. Merely condemning the fact that 
the student failed to pass the test does not enlighten anyone on what caused that 
to happen and subsequently what the focus for the retake should be and how the 
student should proceed so as to avoid a similar downturn.
Obvious analogies can be drawn between the story outlined above and an approach 
towards the injustice of relevance here: poverty. Merely condemning poverty as an 
injustice is the least a moral or global ethics theory can do if it is to be taken seriously. 
It is in fact true that from statism to cosmopolitanism there are not many global 
ethics theories that do not proceed to such a condemnation. Yet, what one would 
demand from a theory of global justice seeking to appropriately conceptualise the 
injustice in hand would be something more: a scrutiny and assessment of its causes. 
On a principle level, we should not be willing to tolerate theorizing that stays on 
the superficial level of outcomes and does not show any willingness to dig deep into 
circumstances (of injustice) that precede the outcome. 
Echoing Marx in his Critique of the Gotha Program, the argument that is being 
pushed here is not merely of technical nature but of a normative one as well. In the 
Critique, Marx launches an attack towards socialists that give policy proposals aimed 
at the superficial level of consumption. Namely Marx maintains that social democrats 
fail to realize that: 
Any distribution whatever the means of consumption is only a consequence of the 
distribution of the conditions of productions themselves4.
As Cohen argues however, Marx does not carry out that sort of critique with merely 
technical aspirations – although these are unambiguously part of it. More specifically 
Cohen states that: it is a confusion to direct censure against the predictable and regular 
consequences of a cause which is not itself subjected to criticism5. Admittedly, the 
critique is (also) oriented towards a denunciation of the social democratic approach 
for its unwillingness to object to the structures that causally lead to what it is sought 
to be tamed – poverty. 
If we are serious about developing an action guiding theory that seeks to decisively 
solve an injustice that we consider as normatively fundamental, then we have to 
investigate for causal links that lead to such an injustice. These links should refer 
us to circumstances that we have to then normatively condemn and thus develop 
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appropriate principles of action in order to solve them. If we for example know that 
the maths student failed the test due to his poor understanding of calculus then we 
cannot regard ‘not knowing calculus’ as a normatively good state of affairs. Hence 
what arises is an action guiding theory that dictates that the student must for example 
study calculus more. The alternative, simply acknowledging the occurrence of an 
injustice and building guidelines for its eradication without any knowledge on the 
causal circumstances that have led to it, cannot be comprehensive to that account. If 
we do not know and are not able to condemn the causes that give rise to an injustice, 
we consider as normatively fundamental we cannot resolutely get rid of that injustice. 
An appropriately fundamental analysis is then one that (at least) a) condemns an 
injustice and b) normatively scrutinizes and condemns its causes. As Cohen maintains: 
If you object the consequences for welfare of a certain structure of property you must, 
at the very least, object to the cause because of its consequences; and if the cause has been 
defended on grounds which rescind from consequences, […] then you must confront those 
grounds6.
III
Moral cosmopolitans have been taking poverty as a societal phenomenon and have 
been attempting to establish duties of moral nature that extend globally. Namely, 
Kok-Chor Tan argues that if we are serious about solving poverty7 we ought to have 
a cosmopolitan theory of justice and not simply a system of humanitarian aid. This 
way he maintains, the duties towards the global poor would be of moral nature. The 
difference between humanitarian aid and moral obligations is that the former lies on a 
“probabilistic” determination of the interaction between two agents whereas the latter 
assesses the institutional context that this interaction is rooted8. Note that Tan here 
is not committed to an institutional basis of justification of justice principles. Such 
a justification would imply that duties of justice arise so long that one is responsible 
for an injustice via the institutions one participates in. In fact, he argues against it 
by endorsing the moral cosmopolitan position suggesting that what one owes to the 
global poor arises from a natural moral duty. Tan attempts to establish here relations 
of justice between the affluent and the poor.
Simon Caney argues that it is a human right not to suffer from poverty, and 
has sought to identify the positive and negative obligations that are generated by 
this right9. Caney has the typical moral cosmopolitan approach by maintaining that 
our duties towards the global poor derive from the very fact that relatively wealthy 
individuals and relatively (and absolutely) poor individuals are humans. Specifically: 
some or all individuals and collective human agents have a moral duty not to deny X to 
others or to deprive them of X10. Caney then argues that our duties practically translate 
to redistributive justice principles in the form of debt relief, and taxation systems11.
Interactional12 cosmopolitans such as Tan and Caney show no attempt to 
conceptualize poverty as a systemic phenomenon. It is obvious that they do not engage 




allow in its eternal conservation. Their analysis is rather focused on the scope of the 
relations that individuals should have against the materially deprived and not on the 
questioning causes of poverty. Moral cosmopolitans such as Tan and Caney have 
found the question: “What do we owe to the global poor?” more compelling than 
“Why are the global poor, poor?”. Following our normative commitments to a global 
justice theory as outlined earlier, answering the first question should only come as a 
follow-up to the latter one. The claim here is not that cosmopolitanism is inadequate 
as a theory but that it rather does not go far enough to achieve its own aims. 
IV
Up to here I have only argued what the appropriate fundamental level is and 
that cosmopolitanism fails to place its analysis on such a level. I still need to show, 
however, why Roemer’s exploitation account succeeds in doing so. If my analysis is 
correct, I will have then hopefully made a (brief) case on why Marxism captures the 
injustice of poverty more appropriately than cosmopolitanism. 
To conceive of Roemerian capitalist exploitation, assume a very general instance of 
a market economy where agents own their labour power while they also own property 
in the form of – among other forms of property – the means of production. Suppose 
that they are also actively part of production and trading and that this results to an 
X distribution income. If we are then to decide whether some agents are exploited or 
not, we would have to compare how good the outcome of X distribution of income 
is with an outcome of an alternative distribution of property13. 
This alternative distribution of property would entail different ownership of the 
initial endowments than the one that X results from. More precisely, Roemer sets the 
following conditions for determining whether an agent is an exploited or exploiting 
one. Assuming that there are two agents - S and S’- then Roemer suggests that 
(1) If S were to withdraw from the society, endowed with its per capita share of society’s 
alienable property, and with its own labor and skills, then S would be better off (in terms 
of income and leisure) than it is at the present allocation; 
(2) If S’ were to withdraw under the same conditions, then S’ would be worse off (in 
terms of income and leisure) than it is at present; 
(3) If S’ gains by virtue of the labor of S14
then we could say that S is an exploited agent while S’ is an exploiting one. 
Under the property relations definition of exploitation, there is a link between the 
distribution of alienable productive means and the distribution of income. Following 
Marx’s intuition on the relation of production, distribution and exchange, what is 
placed in hand is causal relationship between the level of production and the one of 
consumption15. This makes sense if we consider that being better off by withdrawing 
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from society refers to income and leisure. In other words, although exploitation 
happens due to an unequal distribution of the means of production, to determine 
whether an agent is exploited we have to draw comparisons with the outcomes of an 
alternative distribution of productive means. Exploitation then occurs because of the 
inequality in the means of production only if there is causality between access to the 
means of production and income and only if there is an alternative distribution under 
which the exploited would be better of the exploiter worse-off.
In his A General Theory of Exploitation and Class, Roemer formalizes Marxian 
exploitation and shows that income inequality is a necessary outcome of an unequal 
distribution in alienable productive assets16. With the use of game theoretic 
analysis which is independent of the labour theory of value he firstly illustrates the 
traditional Marxist notion of the interconnection of the distributions of production 
and consumption17. Roemer essentially shows that within capitalism, where private 
ownership of the means of production is a necessary condition, there are considerable 
hindrances in the opportunities of the producers which then result in inequalities in 
income. What these result in is a margin between the revenues of the capitalist and 
that of the worker.
As I have hinted earlier however, inequality and poverty can be two different 
states of affairs. Although the (non-comparably defined) poor are unequal in relation 
to the non-poor in terms of income and wealth (yet still absolutely deprived), we 
cannot outright conclude that a condition of inequality – of any kind – necessarily 
includes some individuals that are poor. In other words, although we cannot claim 
that an exploited agent is necessarily a poor agent, we can maintain that a poor agent 
is an exploited agent. In this sense, we cannot simply rely on the formalizations of 
Roemer to conclude that inequality in the means of production leads to poverty but 
we would probably have to make a sociological claim. 
For one we can maintain that there is an undeniable notion of dominance 
attached to the exploiter18–in this case the capitalist. Roemer introduces a very loose 
conception of dominance when he speaks of the fact that the exploiting party is in 
possession of the power to at least prevent the realization of an alternative, non-
exploitative, condition. The power of the exploiter to dominate the exploited, is 
derived by virtue of his class position and income, or in other words, by virtue of his 
ownership of the means of production19.
Not only does the capitalist have the power to maintain the status quo, Wright 
claims, but she has the power to extend it for her benefit20. That is, by being in 
hold of more alienable productive assets than the working class, the capitalists have 
more income and more power to grow the magnitude of exploitation. The scale 
of exploitation is extended so long that the difference of the inequality of income 
between the exploitative and the non-exploitative condition grows. The growing 
inequality between the worker and the capitalist is to the interest of the capitalist as 
it implies more income and wealth on her part. If the capitalist seeks to extend her 
revenues it follows from Roemer that she will seek to claim ownership of more and 




Yet, the capitalist is in need of the worker for – among others – her virtue of 
being a consumer. If the worker does not possess enough income to consume, then 
the capitalist will not have any profits. So, one could claim that poverty is not in 
the interest of the capitalist and hence it is not bound to happen. This would be 
an objection as poverty would have to be attributed circumstances other that the 
differential ownership of the means of production. 
Although the objection reveals some truth, the answer is not difficult to guess 
here. The capitalist has an interest in poverty if he can discriminate between the 
markets where consumption and production are to take place. So long that it is 
not the whole of the population that faces conditions of absolute deprivation then 
poverty works for the benefit of the capitalist as it implies more profit margins. This 
is established by the fact that if production takes place in settings where there are low-
wages and hence low production costs, and consumption in settings where workers 
are relatively wealthy then profit margins are maximized. 
Indeed, if we think about the facts of economic globalization we can observe the 
tendency of privately owned multinational companies to outsource their production 
to places where labour costs are lower and even invest in buying productive assets in 
parts of the world where they are cheaper. As Marx puts it: The need of a constantly 
expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the 
globe21. Examples of that can be seen in Jamaica where multinationals have bought 
land and local companies from the natives which resulted in detrimental living 
conditions for the locals22. 
I should note at this point that suggesting that inequality in the means of 
production causes poverty is completely different than suggesting that that specific 
condition is the sole cause of poverty. Arguing for the latter would imply that 
alleviating inequalities in the means of production would also eradicate poverty once 
and for all. I do not attempt to make such strong claims as without at least some 
empirical defence these would sound over simplistic if not ambiguous and would be 
masking other structural injustices that may be leading to poverty. Roemer in fact 
says that to completely get rid of exploitation as a general principle, we would also 
have to distribute inalienable productive means23. Nonetheless this does not negate 
the causal link between inequalities in the alienable productive means, the structural 
importance of exploitation or the normative merits that the exploitation theory offers.
IV
Having this in mind, exploitation then is normatively bad as it implies that one 
of the two agents fares worse under the exploitative condition than she would have 
under a different distribution of alienable productive assets. Condemning a specific 
distribution of the means of production as exploitative, we are posing an ethical 
judgment by which we consider that specific distribution of alienable productive 
means as normatively objectionable for the reason that there is an alternative option 
which is free of that structural disadvantage. Generally then, the normative bearings 
are generated so long that exploitation implies that in its existence, a distribution 
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of property in the form of the means of production is less desirable than another – 
where exploitation is absent. This alternative arrangement would have to necessarily 
benefit both agents on an equal extent. 
Given this, the causal link that the PR theory of exploitation creates between 
instances of relative and absolute deprivation is of two-fold merit. Evidently, for 
one we are placing a normative judgment on the distribution of income as it is. By 
doing so we are then condemning the current state of absolute deprivation as morally 
problematic24. By claiming that the poor are being morally mistreated in that there 
is a realistic and attainable alternative, under which they would be benefitting more 
than they do now, we are classifying their current material condition as a normatively 
undesirable one. Poverty in this instance is morally condemnable. As with the case 
of cosmopolitanism, normatively condemning poverty is no big news however – yet 
vital given our (cosmopolitan) commitments - and only satisfies the first of the two 
conditions we have set for a global justice theory to be acceptable. 
Yet such a condemnation differs substantially and for the better from the ones 
cosmopolitans proceed to. Recall that in section III we concluded that (moral) 
cosmopolitans have sought to focus on the scope of our relations rather than their 
nature which commits them to classifying poverty as merely bad. This, I maintained, 
is the outcome of an unwillingness to delve into the normative scrutiny of the 
causes of the reality of dire poverty. While both the PR theory of exploitation and 
popular (moral) cosmopolitanism tell us that poverty is a violation of our moral 
commitments, the former does so from the appropriate fundamental level. That is 
after it has assessed its causes (or one of its causes at least) and not simply by virtue of 
its outcome actualities.
To appreciate this differentiation, we have to refer to the second merit of 
exploitation theory with regard to poverty – the normative scrutiny of its causes. 
Adhering to the capitalist exploitation theory we are essentially also normatively 
condemning those circumstances that are causally linked with poverty. With the 
use of the counterfactual, we are maintaining that the current ordering of alienable 
productive means is morally objectionable by virtue of the existence of an alternative 
distribution by which S is not exploited and S’ is not an exploiter. What is followed 
here is the Marxist intuition from the Critique which suggests that we stand opposed 
to what is causally linked to the deprivation of goods. Therefore, since being exploited 
is normatively undesirable, then we ought to object the current distributional 
conditions that lead to such an injustice25. We can claim then, that the injustice in 
exploitation is based on the inequality in the means of production26. Overall, referring 
to the causal link between the inequality in the means of production and poverty, we 
then satisfy the second essential condition that (acceptable) cosmopolitanism has to 
meet: the normative condemnation of the causes of poverty.
If we regard the poor as exploited, and not merely as poor we are stressing the 
denunciation of what essentially constitutes them as poor and not just the mere fact 
that they are poor. In this sense, we are not merely condemning a distributional 




deserved benefit. By maintaining that there is an unfair benefit on the behalf of the 
wealthy, we are suggesting that poverty becomes a violation of justice. This claim is 
strong if we think that the global poor are being put in position of disadvantage for 
morally arbitrary reasons that they cannot influence themselves. For it is considerably 
different to maintain that we ought to alleviate poverty and that poverty breaches a 
condition of justice – where exploitation is absent.
V
Summing up, I have argued that Marxism captures the injustice of poverty at 
a more appropriately fundamental level than cosmopolitanism. In their attempt to 
conceptualize and address poverty cosmopolitans have not engaged in any sort of 
questioning of the economic basis upon which global inequality and global poverty 
is generated and perpetuated. I maintained that Marxism betters cosmopolitanism 
in the fact that it normatively scrutinizes the circumstances of injustice that give rise 
to the normatively fundamental injustice of poverty. Such a process is necessary if 
cosmopolitanism seeks to succeed against itself as a global justice theory. We cannot 
accept any attempt, tool or theory that merely stays on the superficial level facts of 
poverty and does not scrutinize the causally fundamental injustices that give rise 
to such facts as a desirable theory upon which action guiding principles are to be 
based27. Including exploitation as a normative tool in the analysis of poverty on the 
one hand enlightens us on the causal links between instances of relative deprivation 
(the access to MoP) and the absolute deprivation of goods (poverty). This sets our 
analysis on the appropriate fundamental level and equips cosmopolitans with an 
appropriate understanding of the injustice in hand28. 
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